At WAHC'13, Bringer et al. introduced a protocol called SHADE for secure and efficient Hamming distance computation using oblivious transfer only. In this paper, we introduce a generalization of the SHADE protocol, called GSHADE, that enables privacy-preserving computation of several distance metrics, including (normalized) Hamming distance, Euclidean distance, Mahalanobis distance, and scalar product. GSHADE can be used to efficiently compute one-to-many biometric identification for several traits (iris, face, fingerprint) and benefits from recent optimizations of oblivious transfer extensions. GSHADE allows identification against a database of 1 000 Eigenfaces in 1.28 seconds and against a database of 10 000 IrisCodes in 17.2 seconds which is more than 10 times faster than previous works.
INTRODUCTION
Secure Two-Party Computation (S2PC), introduced in the eighties by Yao [45] and Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) [21] enables two parties to interactively compute a function on their private inputs without revealing any information other than what can be inferred from the function output. A natural field of application for S2PC is privacypreserving biometric identification, e.g., [3, 5, 9, 10, 18, 28, 35, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. 38, [41] [42] [43] . In this setting, a client C, who holds a fresh biometric sample of a person, and a server S, who holds a database of biometric data, want to determine whether there is a biometric reference for C in the database of S. C wants to prevent S from learning the query sample, since it would allow S to track the person from which the sample was taken. S, on the other hand, wants to prevent C from learning information about the contents of his database. We describe more detailed examples later in §1. 3 .
Privacy-preserving biometric identification has been researched very extensively in the last years. While the first protocols were based on (additively) homomorphic encryption schemes only (e.g., [18, 38] ), it was soon demonstrated that protocols which use generic secure computation techniques such as Yao's garbled circuits protocol [45] achieve a better performance and allow the extension to a richer set of functionalities. These protocols either combine homomorphic encryption with generic secure computation protocols, e.g., [3, 5, 25, 28, 41] , or exclusively use generic secure computation protocols, e.g., [10, 27, 35] .
A recent development in the area of secure computation is the design of efficient protocols that are based on oblivious transfer (OT) [40] . Although efficient constructions for OT have been known for several years, in particular OT extension [30] which allows to base OT on symmetric cryptographic primitives, OT was regarded as an expensive primitive. However, efficient implementations of OT, e.g., [12, 27] , have shown that OT can be performed at very low cost and have renewed the interest in protocols using OT. An example can be seen in the field of private set-intersection, where an OT-based solution was presented recently [17] that outperforms prior approaches based on homomorphic encryption [14] and generic secure computation [26] . Another example, from the field of biometric identification, is the SHADE (for Secure HAmming DistancE computation) protocol [9] , which allows secure computation of the Hamming distance using OT only. In parallel to these applications of OT, even more efficient OT protocols have been developed recently that further improve the computation and communication complexity of OT extension [1, 32] .
Our Contributions
In this paper, we build on recent developments in the area of efficient OT and develop a generic framework for secure biometric identification, called GSHADE (Generalized SHADE). GSHADE allows the efficient computation of various distance measures such as the (normalized) Hamming distance, the Euclidean distance, the scalar product, and the Mahalanobis distance using OT only. Furthermore, GSHADE can be combined with generic secure computation techniques and hence can be used to efficiently compute a rich set of functionalities that are based on distance measures. We evaluate the efficiency of GSHADE both theoretically and experimentally and compare it to related work. 1 Overall, GSHADE allows a factor of 10 to 20 improvement in runtime compared to the best previous solutions. A brief summary of the runtimes and communication complexities of GSHADE for different biometric identification schemes (described in §4), in combination with the generic secure computation protocol of Golreich-MicaliWigderson (GMW), 2 is depicted in Tab. 1.
Setting
In our setting, a server S and a client C want to securely compute 1-vs-N biometric identification. The actual inputs and possible outputs are given in Fig. 1 . The privacy requirements of S2PC imply that one party does not get more information about the other party's inputs than what can be deduced from its own inputs and outputs. This is formally expressed using a simulation game, see [24] for more details. In this work, we focus on semi-honest (also called passive or honest but curious) adversaries. In this model, privacy of the inputs is ensured against parties that do not cheat but try to infer additional information from the observed messages. In particular, this model guarantees that even an insider that is able to access the communication records of the secure computation is unable to obtain additional information about the inputs. The semi-honest model is sufficient for many applications [6, 7] and allows to construct highly efficient protocols.
Example Use Cases
We emphasize the importance of our GSHADE protocol for biometric identification by giving a non-exhaustive list of use cases to which our solution can be applied.
Anonymous Biometric Access Control. Our first use case deals with biometric access control to, for instance, a company building. The employer S wants to ensure that only the registered (and biometrically enrolled) employees are allowed to enter the building. We can use privacypreserving biometric identification based on our solution to prevent the employer from tracking his employees' activities.
Biometric Anonymous Credentials. In this example, we have three parties: a client C, a service provider P, and a biometric data server holder S. S can be, for instance, a government that holds a database of all people satisfying a given criterion (e.g., be over 21). To access the services of P, C identifies against the database of S. If C was successfully identified, S gives him a token to present to P to prove that 1 Our GSHADE implementation is available online at http: //encrypto.de/code/GSHADE. 2 Alternatively, Yao's garbled circuits protocol could be used.
Inputs:
• Client C inputs a biometric acquisition X
• Server S inputs N biometric data items Y 1 , . . . , Y N Possible Outputs (given to S and/or C):
• A yes/no answer (Is X close enough to one of the Y i s?)
• The index and/or distance of the closest match
• The Y i s that are sufficiently close to X
• An identification score
• All distances between X and the Y i s
• . . . he fulfills the requirements. In the whole process, C reveals his identity neither to P nor to S. Secure Biometric Database Intersection. In our third example, we consider two law enforcement agencies that want to identify the suspects they have in common or that want to determine whether a suspect is registered in a given database. For privacy and security reasons, the involved parties want to keep the data that is not in the intersection secret. Our solution can be adapted to this use case by letting the client input a list of biometric data.
Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe preliminaries for this work in §2, including main techniques for S2PC, the state of the art in privacy-preserving biometric identification, and the original SHADE protocol. We introduce GSHADE, our generalization of the SHADE protocol for computing several distance metrics, in §3 and describe its applications to biometric identification in §4. We give implementation results and compare the performance of GSHADE to the state of the art in §5 and conclude in §6.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we summarize the properties of and techniques used for secure two-party computation ( §2.1), distance metrics for biometric identification ( §2.2), the state of the art in privacy-preserving biometric identification ( §2.3), and the original SHADE protocol ( §2.4). More details on S2PC can for instance be found in [24] , while a deeper study of its application to biometric identification can be found in [8] .
Secure Two-Party Computation (S2PC)
Several techniques can be applied to realize Secure TwoParty Computation (S2PC), most prominently Yao's garbled circuits protocol [45] and the protocol of GoldreichMicali-Wigderson (GMW) [21] that both use oblivious transfer [19, 40] ; or alternatively (additively) homomorphic en-Application SCiFI Faces [38] IrisCodes [16] FingerCodes [31] cryption, e.g., [13] . In the following, we give a short summary of each of these techniques. Oblivious Transfer. A 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) [19, 40] , denoted by OT , is a two-party protocol where one party (the sender) inputs two -bit strings x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and the other party (the receiver) inputs a bit b. At the end of the protocol, the receiver obtains x b but learns no information about x 1−b whereas the sender learns no information about b. OT protocols can be built from public key cryptography, e.g., [36] . For a large number of OTs, OT extension [30] can be used that extends a few base OTs to many OTs using only efficient symmetric cryptographic primitives. Recent work of [32] further improved the communication complexity of OT extension and [1] provides even more efficient protocols for the correlated OT functionality, where the sender inputs only a single value ∆ together with a correlation function f s.t. at the end of the protocol, the sender obtains x0 ∈R {0, 1} and x1 = f∆(x0) as output and the receiver obtains x b .
Yao's Garbled Circuits Protocol. A garbled circuit [45] is an encrypted version of the binary circuit representing the function to be evaluated securely. In Yao's protocol, one party (the sender) generates the garbled circuit by building the binary circuit, choosing a pair of encryption keys for every wire of the circuit, and encrypting the output wire keys using the keys of the input wires. The sender then sends the garbled circuit and the input keys that correspond to his inputs to the second party (the receiver). The receiver obtains the keys corresponding to his inputs by engaging in an oblivious transfer with the sender. Using the obtained input keys, the receiver can then decrypt the garbled circuit to obtain the result while learning no intermediary information. See [27] for a more detailed description.
Yao's protocol relies mostly on symmetric cryptography and is best suited for functions that can efficiently be represented as binary circuits and in environments that have a high communication latency. However, Yao's protocol has a high communication complexity and requires the function and input sizes to be known in advance to allow precomputation. Yao's garbled circuits protocol has been implemented in the FastGC framework [27] . GMW Protocol. Similar to Yao's protocol, the GMW protocol [21] also uses a binary circuit representation of the function, but performs the secure evaluation on shares rather than using encrypted gates. The parties first secret-share their inputs using a XOR secret sharing scheme. To evaluate an XOR gate, the parties simply XOR the shares of the input wires. To evaluate an AND gate, the parties perform an oblivious transfer, where one party pre-computes all possible outputs of the gate and the other party obliviously obtains the output that corresponds to its input shares. To obtain the output of the circuit, the parties exchange the shares of the output wires.
As shown in [1, 12, 42] , the GMW protocol allows the precomputation of all symmetric cryptographic operations before the function or the inputs to the function are known and requires less communication per AND gate than Yao's garbled circuits protocol. However, the GMW protocol requires a number of communication rounds that is linear in the depth of the circuit. The GMW protocol has been implemented in [12] and further optimized for the two-party case in [1, 42] .
Homomorphic Encryption. A public-key encryption is homomorphic if it is possible to compute over encrypted data without the knowledge of the secret key. Although fully homomorphic encryption (i.e., a cryptosystem that is homomorphic for any operation) has been introduced in 2009 [20] , it is not yet practical. Most implemented proposals therefore use additively homomorphic encryption schemes, such as Paillier [39] or Damgård-Geisler-Krøigaard (DGK) [15] .
Homomorphic encryption is more suited for arithmetic circuits and the ciphertexts can be re-used for several instances of secure computation, which reduces the communication complexity. However, homomorphic encryption requires computationally expensive public-key operations that scale very inefficiently for larger security parameters.
Distance Metrics
In the following, we summarize some distance metrics that are used in biometric identification schemes. In §2.3 we will describe which distance is used by which biometric identification scheme and in §3 we will show that each of these distances can be computed efficiently with our generalized SHADE protocol.
Hamming Distance (HD). The Hamming distance between two -bit vectors X = (x1, . . . , x ) and Y = (y1, . . . , y ) is computed as HD(X,
Normalized Hamming Distance (NHD). The normalized Hamming distance between a -bit vector X = (x1, . . . , x ) with -bit mask M = (m1, . . . , m ) and a vector Y = (y1, . . . , y ) with mask M = (m 1 , . . . , m ) is computed
.
Scalar Product (SP). The scalar product between two
, where M is a positive semi-definite matrix (which might be the inverse of the covariant matrix of a sample set). The Mahalanobis distance can be used for instance for hand shape, keystroke, or signature recognition [34] .
Privacy-Preserving Biometric Identification
Several different schemes for privacy-preserving biometric identification using S2PC have been proposed. Most schemes focused on face [18, 38, 41] , fingerprint [3, 5, 28, 43] , or iris [5, 10, 35 ] recognition which we summarize next. We provide more details on the underlying algorithms in §4.
Privacy-preserving face recognition. Privacy-preserving face recognition has been realized based on two different recognition algorithms: Eigenfaces used in [18, 41, 42] and the SCiFI algorithm used in [9, 27, 38, 42] .
In protocols based on the Eigenfaces algorithm [44] , the parties have to perform a projection (matrix-vector or scalar products), compute the Euclidean distance, and compare the resulting distance to a threshold. Erkin et al. [18] suggest to employ additively homomorphic encryption for the whole protocol. Sadeghi et al. [41] showed that a hybrid solution gives better performances, using additively homomorphic encryption for projection and distance computation, then garbled circuits for comparisons. Schneider et al. [42] use GMW, which allows to pre-compute all cryptographic operations and thereby achieves a fast online phase.
The SCiFI algorithm [38] is a face recognition algorithm that is based on the Hamming distance and was specifically designed to yield an efficient privacy-preserving protocol. Originally, Osadchy et al. [38] used additively homomorphic encryption and subsequently Huang et al. [27] and Schneider et al. [42] showed that using Yao's garbled circuits respectively GMW results in better performances. The SHADE protocol of Bringer et al. [9] is an even more efficient construction based on oblivious transfer (cf. §2.4 for details).
Privacy-preserving fingerprint recognition. Secure fingerprint recognition has been considered using two main solutions. The FingerCodes technique [31] relies on Euclidean distance and has been proposed in [3, 5, 28] , which use additively homomorphic encryption for Euclidean distance and several solutions for comparison/identification operations. Use of minutiae-based fingerprint recognition [34] has been envisioned in [5, 43] , but we do not further discuss it in this paper as it does not fit our protocol.
Privacy-preserving iris recognition. Iris recognition using IrisCodes [16] requires secure evaluation of normalized Hamming distances and has first been considered by Blanton et al. [5] using homomorphic encryption, then by Luo et al. [35] and Bringer et al. [10] using Yao's garbled circuits.
Secure Hamming Distance Computation (SHADE)
The SHADE protocol [9] allows efficient secure Hamming distance computation using oblivious transfer. In the following we describe the original SHADE protocol and its extension to the 1-vs-N case.
The SHADE Protocol. The SHADE protocol was first intended for secure computation of Hamming distances. For S and C with -bit inputs Y and X the protocol works as follows. S and C perform OT log 2 ( +1) where, in the ith OT, S chooses a random ri ∈R Z +1 and inputs (ri + yi, ri + (yi ⊕ 1)) and C inputs yi as choice bit and receives ti = ri + (xi ⊕ yi). S then sums up the random masks and outputs R = i=1 ri and C sums up the received values and outputs T = i=1 ti. Note that we have
SHADE for the 1-vs-N Case. SHADE was observed to be efficiently extendable to the 1-vs-N case, where S holds N -bit values Y 1 , . . . , Y N and C holds a single -bit value X. The only additional overhead for the extended protocol is longer bit strings in the oblivious transfers. More detailed, in the i-th OT, the parties perform OT N log 2 ( +1) where S inputs (r 
In the final step, the parties can again simply compute and output R 1 , . . . , R N and
and
OUR GENERALIZED SHADE (GSHA-DE) PROTOCOL
In this section we describe our generalized SHADE protocol, called GSHADE, which allows to compute different distances ( §3.1). We describe how to combine GSHADE with comparison or minimum protocols ( §3.2), outline how to efficiently extend it to 1-vs-N matching ( §3.3) and how to base it on the more efficient correlated OT functionality ( §3.4). We give applications of GSHADE to biometric identification with new adaptations for IrisCodes and Eigenfaces later in §4.
The GSHADE Protocol
We observe that the original SHADE protocol extends to the family F GSHADE of functions that can be expressed
n is the input of C and Y is the input of S. (The set S to which Y belongs does not impact the protocol.) In particular, several metrics used for biometric matching are included in this family of functions:
Hamming Distance X = (x1, . . . , x ) and Y = (y1, . . . , y ) are n = -bit vectors. We have fX = fY = 0 and fi(xi, Y ) = xi ⊕ yi, for i = 1, . . . , n.
We have fX = fY = 0 and
Squared Mahalanobis Distance We assume that M = (Muv)u,v=1,...,K is known by both parties, and not a private input of either party.
In Fig. 2 , we describe the generalized SHADE protocol. Note that m is such that the output of f (X, Y ) belongs to Zm. For instance, if f is the Hamming distance between two -bit vectors, we set m = + 1.
Inputs:
• C inputs a n-bit string X = (x1, . . . , xn)
• S inputs Y ∈ S Outputs:
• S obtains R ∈R Zm
1. S chooses n random values r1, . . . , rn ∈R Zm.
2. For each i = 1, . . . , n, S and C engage in a OT log 2 (m) where
• S acts as the sender and C as the receiver.
• C's selection bit is xi.
• S's input is (ri + fi(0, Y ), ri + fi(1, Y )).
• The output obtained by C is consequently ti = ri + fi(xi, Y ). Correctness. Since r1, . . . , rn are picked uniformly at random over Zm, then, for fixed X and
C computes and outputs
T = Σ n i=1 ti + fX (X).
S computes and outputs
Security. The proof of security of GSHADE is similar to that of SHADE [9] . We give a proof sketch against static semi-honest adversaries next. Security is proven by simulation in the OT-hybrid setting, where OTs are simulated by 3 This assumption is reasonable, for instance, if MD is used instead of ED in the Eigenfaces protocol (see §4.4). Indeed, the matrix M would only disclose statistical information about the projection space, which is not very sensitive, whereas the Eigenfaces basis gives information about real biometric data (they can reveal "average" faces) and should be kept private, as it is the case in our protocol. a trusted oracle. We recall that each simulator is provided with the input and output of the corrupted party. Case 1 -S is corrupted. Since S receives no messages beyond those in OT, its view can be perfectly simulated. Case 2 -C is corrupted. Given C's output T and input X, C's view can be perfectly simulated by sending random values t 1 , . . . , t n−1 ∈R Zm and t n = T − n−1 i=1 t i − fX (X) to C in the OTs.
Adding Comparison or Minimum
In some use-cases of privacy-preserving biometric identification, it is required that the parties learn whether the distance is lower than a certain threshold (comparison) or the index of the closest match (minimum). For these protocols, we require a secure comparison or minimum operation after the distance calculation, which keeps the resulting distance secret. Using GSHADE does not improve comparison or minimum operations. However, if one runs GSHADE, the masked results can easily be used as input to a secure comparison or minimum protocol. Several protocols are possible, depending on the actual desired output. We refer the reader to the papers mentioned in §2.3 for an overview. Note that for Yao's garbled circuits protocol and the GMW protocol, we have to build a circuit which first reconstructs f (X, Y ) = T − R and subsequently computes the desired functionality. In our experiments in §4 we use the GMW protocol for the comparison or minimum operations.
Adaptation to the 1-vs-N case
Analogue to the original SHADE protocol, the GSHADE protocol can be efficiently extended to the 1-vs-N biometric identification, where the client has one input X and the server has N inputs Y • C's selection bit is xi.
• The output obtained by C is (t1,i|| . . .
3. C computes and outputs
4. S computes and outputs
Note that the number n of OTs remains unchanged compared to the 1-vs-1 case and only the length of the inputs grows linearly with the number of database entries N . As the protocol is essentially a parallel execution of the basic GSHADE protocol, but using OTs with longer strings, correctness and security carry over from GSHADE (cf. §3.1).
Using Correlated OTs
As described in §2.1, the correlated OT (C-OT) extension protocol of [1] has an even lower communication complexity than generic OT extension. Here, the sender obtains one randomly chosen value as output and inputs a correlation that determines the second value. This functionality was initially used for Yao's protocol with the free-XOR technique [33] 
where ∆ is a fixed offset. In the following we show how GSHADE can be based on C-OT instead of OT. Here we assume that m is a power of 2 (we discuss the case where m is not a power of 2 in Appendix A). The GSHADE protocol can be rewritten as follows:
1. For each i = 1, . . . , n, S and C engage in a C-OT log 2 (m) where
• C acts as the receiver with selection bit xi.
• S acts as the sender with input ∆i = fi(1, Y ) − fi(0, Y ).
• The correlation function is f∆ i (·) = · + ∆i.
• The output obtained by S is ρi ∈R Zm.
• The output obtained by C is τi = ρi − fi(0, Y ) + fi(xi, Y ).
C computes and outputs T
= n i=1 τi + fX (X).
S computes and outputs
R = n i=1 (ρi − fi(0, Y )) − fY (Y ).
Correctness. During the
Thus, R ∈R Zm and T = R + f (X, Y ) and the protocol is correct.
Security. Security is proven in a similar way as for the OT-based GSHADE protocol described in §3.1. We still give a proof sketch against static semi-honest adversaries. Here, we assume that C-OTs are simulated by a trusted oracle. Case 1 -S is corrupted. Given S's output R and input Y , S's view can be perfectly simulated by sending random values ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n−1 ∈R Zm and ρ n = R −
Case 2 -C is corrupted. Given C's output T and input X, C's view can be perfectly simulated by sending random values τ 1 , . . . , τ n−1 ∈R Zm and τ n = T −
This adaptation is also compatible with the 1-vs-N version of GSHADE described in §3.3. Using the C-OT extension protocol of [1] allows to reduce the asymptotic communication complexity by a factor of two compared to using the original OT extension of [30] , cf. [1] .
APPLICATIONS
We demonstrate several applications where the GSHADE protocol can be used for secure and efficient distance computations: the SCiFI ( §4.1) and Eigenfaces ( §4.4) protocol for face recognition, the IrisCodes ( §4.2) protocol, and the FingerCodes ( §4.3) protocol. In Tab. 2 we summarize the parameters for the distances used, the number of OTs n, and the length of the OTs' outputs. Note that the parameters in Tab. 2 include optimizations proposed in previous works.
SCiFI
In the setting of face recognition using SCiFI [38] , biometric vectors are = 900-bit binary vectors that are compared using Hamming distance. One can simply apply the original SHADE protocol of [9] which is a special case of our GSHADE protocol. The authors of [38] point out that the Hamming distances in the SCiFI protocol never exceeded 180. Thus, we decrease the range of Hamming distances from Z901 to Z181. Therefore, in case of SCiFI, we have to perform n = = 900 OTs on log 2 181 N = 8N -bit strings.
IrisCodes
IrisCodes [16] are 512-byte representations of iris images made of a template and a mask of = 2048-bit each. The mask signifies reliable bits of the iris template, i.e., a mask bit set to 1 indicates that the corresponding template bit is reliable, while a mask bit set to 0 indicates an erasure (due to eyelids, eyelashes, blurs,. . . ). IrisCodes can be compared using normalized Hamming distance (NHD).
One can see that normalized Hamming distance does not exactly match the family F GSHADE . However, if we adopt the convention that a template bit which is associated to a 0 in the mask is also set to 0, which is not restrictive, numerator (num) and denominator (den) of normalized Hamming distance both match the family. We integrate both template and mask to the input vector. Let n = 2 ,
and f num i+ be defined as in Tab. 3. Our convention enforces that (x i+ = 0 =⇒ xi = 0) (and same for Y ), for each i = 1, . . . , . If both inputs X and Y respect this convention, then one can easily check that Outputting the numerator and the denominator does not satisfy complete privacy requirements, if one wants to securely evaluate the normalized Hamming distance. Nevertheless, our goal is to apply GSHADE to biometric identification. Thus, instead of outputting NHD, we output the result of NHD(X, Y ) ? < t, which can be rewritten as
, where 0 < t < 1 is a threshold. Thus, one runs GSHADE on both f num and f den . C obtains
while S holds masks R num and R den (see Fig. 2 ). If t is known by C, then C includes T num and t · T den and S inputs R num and t · R den to a protocol that first pairwise subtracts inputs and then compares the results. If t is not known by C, Protocol Operation n log 2 (m) SCiFI [38] Hamming Distance 900 8 IrisCodes [5] Normalized Hamming Distance 2 048 + 2 048 31 + 11 FingerCodes [28] Euclidean Distance 640 × 8 = 5 120 16 Eigenfaces (projection) [18, 25, 41, 42] Scalar Product 10 304 × 8 = 82 432 12 × 30 = 360 Eigenfaces (distance) [18, 25, 41, 42] Euclidean Distance 12 × 30 = 360 50 Table 2 : Parameters used in our experiments (n: number of OTs, Zm: range of OT inputs).
this secure protocol should first include a secure multiplication step or GSHADE should be run on t · f den . When actually running this protocol, we suggest to run n OTs for both f num and f den , where the first OTs only concern f num while the last OTs concatenate contributions to both f num and f den . Thus, complexity (before comparison) is × OT log 2 ( ) + × OT 2 log 2 ( ) in the 1-vs-1 case or × OT N log 2 ( ) + × OT 2N log 2 ( ) in the 1-vs-N case.
FingerCodes
Fingerprint recognition via FingerCodes [31] uses a global representation (unlike the more standard minutiae-based recognition protocols that describe local features) of biometric data as integer vectors. Comparison between two biometric data samples is then simply done using Euclidean distance. As mentioned in §3.1, one can directly apply GSHADE to securely evaluate this metric. In general, without experimental optimizations, one has to perform n = K OTs on N (2 + log 2 (K) )-bit inputs. Two different sets of parameters for FingerCodes were suggested: [3, 5] use K = 16-dimensional vectors of = 7-bit elements and perform the comparison on 19-bit results while [28] uses K = 640-dimensional vectors of = 8-bit elements and performs the comparison on 16-bit results. Consequently, for the parameters of [3, 5] we have to perform n = K = 112 OTs on 19N -bit strings, and for the parameters of [28] we have to perform n = 5 120 OTs on 16N -bit strings. For our experiments in Tab. 1 we choose the parameters of [28] .
Eigenfaces
In the setting of face recognition using Eigenfaces [44] , the client holds a face image X = (x1, . . . , x K ) withbit elements and the server holds an average face image Ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψ K ), a set of Eigenfaces (U 1 , . . . , U K ), with U j = (u We suggest to use our GSHADE protocol to securely compute the first two steps, in the following way:
Projection. The operation consists of a subtraction then a scalar product and thus belongs to the family of functions that can be computed using GSHADE. Since C uses the same input for all K projections, one can use the 1-vs-K variant described in §3.3. Thus, C gets T =X + R = (x1 + r1, . . . ,xK + rK ) and S gets R = (r1, . . . , rK ), where the ris are random masks in Zp, where p = 2 2 + log 2 K . Note that here we compute this step asxj = SP(X, U j ) − SP(Ψ, U k ), i.e., −SP(Ψ, U j ) is computed on the server's side as part of fY (with notations of §3.1).
Distance. Here C and S use the GSHADE protocol a second time in the 1-vs-N variant, where the computed function is (T ; R, Y ) → ED(T − R, Y ), which is included in F GSHADE . For the parameters used in [18, 25, 41, 42] , the projection is computed on K = 10 304-dimensional vectors with = 8-bit elements and yields a 30-bit result on a K = 12-dimension plane. The Euclidean distance is then computed on K = 12-dimensional vectors with 30-bit elements and results in a 50-bit value. Thus, we have to perform 82 432 OTs on 360-bit elements and 360 OTs on 50N -bit elements. Notice that the cost of the projection phase is independent of the size of the database N .
We emphasize that GSHADE can be applied to other privacy-preserving biometric recognition protocols that follow the same architecture as Eigenfaces, such as Fisherfaces [4] , where the difference mostly lies in the algorithm to choose the basis (in the case of Fisherfaces, Linear Discriminant Analysis instead of Principal Component Analysis for Eigenfaces) and thus does not impact the identification protocol.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of GSHADE. We discuss the use of quantized inputs in §5.1, asymptotic complexities are studied in §5.2 and our experimental results are described and compared to the state of the art in §5.3.
Quantization
Our GSHADE protocol relies on the fact that inputs are binary vectors, either originally binary or by binarizing vectors of integers. However, it is often the case that the coordinates of feature vectors used for, e.g., face recognition are real or floating point numbers. It must be validated that the same protocols can be used on integer or binary inputs without loss of accuracy. Erkin et al. [18] showed, from experiments on the AT&T [2] database, that integers can be used as inputs to the Eigenfaces protocol (by multiplying original inputs by 1 000) without reliability losses and parameters used in [18] are chosen accordingly.
The performance of GSHADE is directly related to the size of the inputs, but also to the size of the outputs ( log 2 (m) in Tab. 2). We ran experiments to show that the outputs' size could be further reduced without impacting accuracy. Our biometric experiments have been con-ducted on the AT&T [2] and Multi-PIE [11, 22] (restricted to frontal images taken using camera 05 1) databases, using the Python Face Recognition Library [23, 29] . We took 30 eigenfaces (instead of 12 for [18] ) and showed that the size of the projected faces could be reduced to 30 × 13 = 390-bit vectors, which is comparable to the parameters of [18] . However, our analysis showed that squared Euclidean distances can be reduced to 26-bit (for the AT&T database) or 24-bit integers (for the Multi-PIE database), which is about half the size used in [18, 25, 41, 42] . Using these parameters would allow to further decrease the communication complexity of GSHADE by about a factor of two without any loss in correctness, accuracy, or security. However, aiming at fairness in our comparison to other protocols, experiments described in §5.3 were run with the same parameters as in [18, 25, 41, 42] .
Asymptotic Performance Comparison
In the following we compare the asymptotic performance of the GSHADE protocol when computing various distances to related work. The parameters that affect the performance of GSHADE are the number of OTs and the length of strings that are transferred obliviously. In the following, κ is the symmetric security parameter and ρ is the asymmetric security parameter (in our experiments in §5.3 we set κ = 80 and ρ = 1 024).
In Tab. 4, we summarize the asymptotic computation and communication complexities when computing different distance metrics using GSHADE with those of secure distance computation protocols in related work ( §2.3). For each solution, we outline the technique that is used, i.e., homomorphic encryption (HE), garbled circuits (GC), GMW, or GSHADE, the computation complexity of S (which dominates the one of C) and the overall communication. Note that the complexities only include the distance computation excluding later computation steps such as minimum, greater than, and so on. However, each of the solutions can be extended by a generic secure computation protocol to obtain the desired functionality. We obtain the computation complexity for HE by counting the number of modular exponentiations and for GC, GMW, and GSHADE by counting the number of symmetric cryptographic operations. For GC we determine the communication complexity as the size of the garbled circuit (3κ bits per non-linear gate using the free XOR [33] and garbled row reduction [37] techniques) plus the number of input keys of the server (κ bits per S's input bit). We neglect the inputs of C as these do not depend on the database size N . For GMW, the communication complexity is two symmetric keys per non-linear gate (see complexity analysis in [1, 42] ). The complexity of GSHADE takes into account the C-OT technique of [1] : communication complexity for n × C − OT is n × ( + κ) bits and computation complexity is 3n+2n /o symmetric operations, where o is the output size of the PRF (pseudo-random function) used by the C-OT (see [1] ). The HE-based protocols of [3, 5, 18, 25, 28, 38] to compute the Hamming distance, scalar product, and Euclidean distance use Paillier's additively homomorphic encryption [39] , so ciphertexts have size 2ρ bits. For GSHADE and HE we include in Tab. 4 some communication that does not depend on N , but that might be dominant when N is not too large (e.g., for a few dozens or hundreds of entries).
Computation. For the Hamming distance and normalized Hamming distance, where the HE, GC, and GMW techniques have a computation complexity that is linear in N , GSHADE achieves a computation complexity linear in (N log 2 )/o. Considering that the output size of the PRF o is in the order of some hundred bits (e.g., 128, 192, or 256), while log 2 is much smaller (e.g., about 10 for SCiFI and IrisCodes), the computation complexity of GSHADE is considerably smaller than that of the previous techniques, especially compared to HE based solutions because of the cost of asymmetric operations. For the scalar product and Euclidean distance, GMW requires O(N K 2 ) symmetric cryptographic operations while GSHADE requires O(N K 2 /o) and hence GSHADE has a smaller computation complexity by around a factor of o. The HE-based schemes, on the other hand, achieve a performance of N K asymmetric cryptographic operations, compared to 4N K 2 /o symmetric cryptographic operations in GSHADE. However, asymmetric cryptographic operations, i.e., modular exponentiations, are usually several orders of magnitudes slower than symmetric cryptographic operations such as AES or SHA, especially when increasing the security parameter. We provide concrete performance numbers in our experiments in §5.3.
Communication. For all distances, we can observe that GSHADE requires transmitting some orders of magnitude less data than the generic secure computation protocols (GC or GMW). When comparing the communication complexity of GSHADE to HE-based protocols, on the other hand, the communication complexity of GSHADE depends highly on the bit length . For the Hamming distance and normalized Hamming distance, the communication complexity of GSHADE grows with O(N log 2 ) while the communication complexity of HE-based protocols grows with 2N ρ. In biometric identification protocols that use (normalized) Hamming distance the bitlength is relatively large (e.g., ∈ {900, 2 048}) s.t. log 2 > 2ρ and the communication complexity of GSHADE is higher than that of HEbased protocols. This is also the case for the scalar product and Euclidean distance where the communication complexity of GSHADE grows with 2N K 2 which is higher than the 2N ρ of HE-based protocols. Still, in our experiments in §5.3 GSHADE requires less than three times more communication than HE-based protocols.
Experimental Performance Comparison
In the following, we experimentally compare the performance of GSHADE to that of related work on the Eigenfaces and IrisCodes applications.
Experimental Setup. For all schemes, we compare the overall run-time and estimated communication complexity. We measured the complexity for our GSHADE protocol and compare it to the numbers reported in related work. We do not claim that we provide a fair comparison, since the results were measured on different machines and using different programming languages. Moreover, most implementations are not publicly available. We rather intend for the experiments to support the asymptotic complexities summarized in Tab. 4. However, we argue that the orders of magnitude improvements that we obtain are too significant to be explained by the use of different programming languages, libraries, or hardware alone. Note that, other than some related works, we only give the overall complexities and do not divide them into pre-computation and online phase. We Distance Metric [3, 5, 18, 25, 28] N K asym 2(N + K)ρ GMW [42] 8N Table 4 : Asymptotic complexities for different 1-vs-N distance metrics with bit length , PRF output size o, vector dimension K, symmetric security parameter κ, and asymmetric security parameter ρ.
point out that, since the only cryptographic protocol that we use is OT, we can pre-compute all required cryptographic operations and thereby achieve a very efficient online phase, as demonstrated in [12, 42] . We implemented our GSHADE protocol using the correlated OT extension from the C++ OT library of [1] . For evaluating the comparison and minimum circuits, we use the C++ GMW implementation of [12] with optimizations of [42] and the random OT extension protocol of [1] . We chose the GMW framework of [12] as it is implemented in the same programming language and is also extensively based on OT. However, as GSHADE is independent of the generic secure computation protocol, we could alternatively use Yao's garbled circuits protocol, e.g., as implemented in [27] . For the WiFi experiments in Tab. 1 we limit the bandwidth between the PCs using the tc command. In order to allow comparison with previous works we also use short-term security parameters, i.e., symmetric security parameter κ = 80 and asymmetric security parameter ρ = 1 024. We run our experiments on two 3.2 GHz Intel i5-4570 CPUs with 8 GB RAM each running Ubuntu 12.04 that are connected via Gigabit LAN.
SCiFI
The SCiFI protocol for face-recognition was specifically designed to be computed in a privacy-preserving fashion and has been implemented using various secure computation protocols. While the seminal work of [38] introduced the SCiFI algorithm and used homomorphic encryption to perform face-recognition, [27] and [42] improved on its performance by expressing the SCiFI functionality as binary circuit and evaluate it using Yao's garbled circuits protocol and the GMW protocol, respectively. The original SHADE protocol [9] improved on the performance of both when securely computing the Hamming distance. In the following we compare the performance of GSHADE, which in the case of SCiFI is the same as the SHADE protocol. We depict our results in Tab. 5.
From our results we can observe that the (G)SHADE protocol outperforms previous protocols both in communication and computation. Additionally, compared to the GMW implementation of [42] , the performance of (G)SHADE scales better with increasing database size, resulting in an increasing runtime advantage of factor 4-5 and a communication advantage of factor 14 for 50 000 elements.
IrisCodes
We perform the IrisCode experiments using the same parameters as [5] , where the iris codes X, Y i is below the threshold, the protocol outputs a match for Y i , which can be done by evaluating a circuit consisting of 2c OR-gates. For our experiments, we set the number of rotations to c = 0, since performing c rotations essentially adds the same performance overhead for both, the protocol of [5] and GSHADE, as increasing the database size N by factor 2c + 1.
Performances of GSHADE applied to IrisCode identification are depicted in Tab. 6 . We observe that the performance of GSHADE for biometric IrisCode identification is acceptable overall, but as shown in Tab. 1 it is the slowest among all biometric identification protocols we tested. This low performance can be explained by the high amount of single-bit operations that are required to process the data in the OTs. While other applications process the data byte-wise or, in the case of SCiFI, require only few bitwise operations, the IrisCode application makes an extensive use of bitwise operations, thereby becoming far less efficient than other applications. However, we stress that a more careful implementation of bit operations as well as pre-computing required inputs would further decrease the runtime of GSHADE. In particular, all the values fi(0, Y j ) and fi(1, Y j ) can be computed once, when a data Y j is added to the database, and stored with the database, instead of computing them online.
As shown in Tab. 6, the communication complexity of GSHADE is around 3 times higher compared to the homomorphic encryption based protocol of [5] . However, the overall computation time is much lower for GSHADE than for [5] : GSHADE is about 35 times faster for N = 320 and 12 times faster for N = 10 000. Note that this improvement by more than one order of magnitude is significant and does not result from using different hardware. Table 6 : Performances of privacy-preserving IrisCode identification protocols.
FingerCodes
For privacy-preserving FingerCode identification, we compare GSHADE to [28] , which uses Paillier encryption to compute the Euclidean distance and garbled circuits to find the minimum. The results of this comparison are depicted in Tab. 7. Note that we excluded the backtracking step of [28] in the evaluation, which can be added if necessary.
While our protocol only slightly improves the communication complexity, the runtime improvements are significant, i.e., do not only result from choosing a different programming language. Our protocol improves the runtime by factor 500 for N = 128 elements and by factor 700 for N = 1 024 elements.
Eigenfaces
Secure computation of face recognition using Eigenfaces has been initially proposed based on homomorphic encryption [18] and subsequently the runtime has been improved by using a combination of homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits [25, 41] and using the GMW protocol [42] . These works use the same parameters summarized in Tab. 2 and we give a performance comparison with our protocol in Tab. 8 .
We observe that GSHADE achieves a very efficient runtime and achieves a speedup of factor 20 over the GMWbased protocol of [42] and even factor 66 to 100 over the HEbased protocols of [18, 25] . Note that these runtime improvements of orders of magnitude are significant and hence do not only result from using different programming languages and hardware. The communication complexity of GSHADE is several times lower than that of the GMW-based solution and even comparable to the HE-based protocols.
CONCLUSION
We described an efficient protocol called GSHADE to securely evaluate several distance metrics ((normalized) Hamming distance, Euclidean distance, scalar product, Mahalanobis distance) and showed that it can be used for efficient privacy-preserving biometric identification of several biometric traits (iris, face, fingerprint) and protocols (SCiFI, Eigenfaces, Fisherfaces, FingerCodes, IrisCodes). GSHADE is based on oblivious transfer and benefits from recently proposed optimizations for oblivious transfer extensions. Our performance analysis shows that, depending on the traits, GSHADE can be used for privacy-preserving identification against up to several thousand database items per second.
We believe that GSHADE can be used for several applications in signal processing, pattern recognition, or image processing that require privacy. Finding further applications of GSHADE is an interesting topic for future research. 
